Sunday, September 04, 2005

diplomasi indonesia menurun

indosiar.com, Jakarta - Anggota Komisi I DPR RI (bidang pertahanan dan luar negri) Ade Daud Nasution menganggap munculnya desakan ‘reshuffle’ kabinet adalah hal yang wajar karena kinerja kabinet tidak optimal.
Menurut Ade Daud kepada wartawan di Gedung MPR/DPR Jakarta, Jumat (26/08/2005) kemarin, desakan pergantian kabinet terutama mengganti Menlu Hassan Wirajuda, karena kinerja diplomasi Indonesia di luar negeri berdasarkan pengamatan anggota Komisi I akhir-akhir ini menurun. Diplomasi Indonesia kurang agresif dan kurang efektif.
Upaya Deplu melakukan diplomasi melalui kegiatan internasional yang dilangsungkan di Jakarta juga kurang mengena sasaran. Sementara Indonesia dalam beberapa bulan terakhir menjadi tuan rumah pertemuan internasional, namun gagal memanfaatkan momentum itu untuk mendapatkan dukungan dari negara-negara lain mengenai apa yang akan diperkuat Indonesia dalam percaturan dunia. “Kita telah menjadi tuan rumah KTT Asia-Afrika, namun gagal mendapatkan dukungan dari negara lain dalam beberapa hal penting, katakanlah, untuk persoalan rekonsiliasi dengan Timtim. Momentum ini juga gagal kita manfaatkan untuk meminta dukungan negara-negara Asia-Afrika agar Dewan Keamanan PBB direformasi, bahkan untuk sekadar menjadi anggota sementara DK PBB kita tidak pasti,” tegasnya.
Dia mengatakan, sejumlah orang di DPR siap menjadi Menlu menggantikan Hasan Wirajuda. “Banyak kader di DPR ini yang bagus dan siap, seperti Amris Hasan. Kabarnya Golkar juga sudah menyiapkan Ibrahim Ambong (mantan Ketua Komisi I DPR),” jelas Ade yang juga menyatakan siap apabila ditunjuk menjadi Menlu.(Ald/Idh)

PLN indonesia

The Jakarta Post, September 29, 2004Presidential transition and RI's foreign policy
Following clear signs that Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is set to lead the country, he was reported as saying that domestic problems would be the focus of his policy in his first 100 days. He also said he would refrain from making foreign trips (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 23).
His view likely rests on the conviction that he should first handle the country's paramount domestic problems; that foreign policy would be a later priority for his government after restoring domestic chaos.
Susilo won the mandate from the people to bring change to the country and create a better Indonesia. The public will be observing very closely whether the next government is really committed to change. But what the country needs now is effective leadership in domestic as well as foreign policy.
On the foreign policy front in particular, a change of government should not in any way downgrade our nation's effectiveness in the international community.
The former U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson once reminded the American people during the 1952-1953 transition from president Harry Truman to Dwight Eisenhower that "some work in the process we were able to carry through home and abroad; other matters languished, while the great external realm waited to see what manner of man follow us".
In this context, the message is clear that Susilo as the country's next president will also need to have a full and proper understanding of our foreign policy so as to make Indonesia's international standing even more solid and respected.
To achieve such an objective, Susilo should attempt to build a national consensus that domestic national policies will not be effective if they are not related to an international framework.
It is against such a background that Susilo needs to embark on foreign trips at the earliest time of his presidency, particularly to ASEAN countries as this has been a tradition for quite some time. Susilo must not skip important regional meetings such as the ASEAN summit in Laos, APEC forum in Chile or the ASEM summit in Hanoi later this year.
Such multilateral forums provide ample opportunity for him to introduce fresh ideas about Indonesia's approach to regional and international affairs as well as to explain the changes to be initiated by the new government.
To balance between domestic and international needs is perhaps the biggest challenge of Susilo government. He must realize that foreign policy can be effective way to meet the country's domestic needs. The next government should be aware that peace, stability and prosperity at home are also influenced by external developments and the government must try to influence those developments by mobilizing whatever resources are available.
We must be able to seize the opportunities provided by the transition, but we also have to be fully aware that presidential transition can represent periods of lost opportunity, if not danger. The reliability of Indonesia's diplomacy during the Megawati government, as perceived at least by the countries in our immediate region, seemed to have been lessened by the seemingly unclear foreign policy objectives that accompanied the changeover from president Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati.
As the presidential transition here takes place at the time of growing complexity and uncertainty in our strategic environment, nothing would do better to accelerate the transition and reduce the cost than to achieve a general consensus at home on the direction of our domestic and foreign policies.
While in today's complex world it is unlikely, if not impossible, for us here to achieve a national consensus on all aspects of foreign policy, better mutual understanding and support on the country's future international role should be effectively sought. Such support would not only decrease the danger that unwise foreign policy would backfire on the country, but also helps to give the new president an armory of tested policies to strengthen his capacity to face foreign policy challenges.
Susilo has hinted his administration would launch a series of bold new policies. This would lead to changes, some of which would be fundamental ones.
However, Susilo should not overlook at least three cautionary notes:
First, he should not undertake foreign policy changes simply for the sake of appearing different from his predecessor.
Second, he should remember that while Indonesia is perceived as the most influential country in the region, it continues to struggle for its economic recovery. This country must proceed with a degree of consistency in relations so as to maintain external resources for its economic development.
Third, Susilo's administration should beware of the "100 days syndrome", especially as it affects foreign policy, which would cause Susilo and his team to believe that if they have not made momentous decisions by the end of their first three months, they would fail in the next five years.
It is a political reality that foreign policy issues did not attract the attention of the presidential candidates during the election campaigns. But because foreign policy is indeed an instrument to promote and articulate national interests abroad, it is perhaps wise for one to call for a greater continuity of foreign policy insofar as it reflects an underlying consensus about our major foreign policy objectives.
Sudden basic shifts and changes in foreign policy could destabilize and disrupt the country.
Therefore, Susilo's foreign policy team should reach a consensus that the next administration's foreign policy must be built upon pragmatic, realistic and rational thought. This should then be translated into a fresh foreign policy agenda that is oriented toward overcoming our domestic problems.
The new president must have a good grasp of the country's international affairs and understand the importance of international links to the solution of our domestic problems. Coherence and consistency in foreign policy are best served if the president has only one principle lieutenant in that area, the minister for foreign affairs.

FP Indonesia

The Jakarta Post, September 29, 2004Presidential transition and RI's foreign policy
Following clear signs that Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is set to lead the country, he was reported as saying that domestic problems would be the focus of his policy in his first 100 days. He also said he would refrain from making foreign trips (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 23).
His view likely rests on the conviction that he should first handle the country's paramount domestic problems; that foreign policy would be a later priority for his government after restoring domestic chaos.
Susilo won the mandate from the people to bring change to the country and create a better Indonesia. The public will be observing very closely whether the next government is really committed to change. But what the country needs now is effective leadership in domestic as well as foreign policy.
On the foreign policy front in particular, a change of government should not in any way downgrade our nation's effectiveness in the international community.
The former U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson once reminded the American people during the 1952-1953 transition from president Harry Truman to Dwight Eisenhower that "some work in the process we were able to carry through home and abroad; other matters languished, while the great external realm waited to see what manner of man follow us".
In this context, the message is clear that Susilo as the country's next president will also need to have a full and proper understanding of our foreign policy so as to make Indonesia's international standing even more solid and respected.
To achieve such an objective, Susilo should attempt to build a national consensus that domestic national policies will not be effective if they are not related to an international framework.
It is against such a background that Susilo needs to embark on foreign trips at the earliest time of his presidency, particularly to ASEAN countries as this has been a tradition for quite some time. Susilo must not skip important regional meetings such as the ASEAN summit in Laos, APEC forum in Chile or the ASEM summit in Hanoi later this year.
Such multilateral forums provide ample opportunity for him to introduce fresh ideas about Indonesia's approach to regional and international affairs as well as to explain the changes to be initiated by the new government.
To balance between domestic and international needs is perhaps the biggest challenge of Susilo government. He must realize that foreign policy can be effective way to meet the country's domestic needs. The next government should be aware that peace, stability and prosperity at home are also influenced by external developments and the government must try to influence those developments by mobilizing whatever resources are available.
We must be able to seize the opportunities provided by the transition, but we also have to be fully aware that presidential transition can represent periods of lost opportunity, if not danger. The reliability of Indonesia's diplomacy during the Megawati government, as perceived at least by the countries in our immediate region, seemed to have been lessened by the seemingly unclear foreign policy objectives that accompanied the changeover from president Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati.
As the presidential transition here takes place at the time of growing complexity and uncertainty in our strategic environment, nothing would do better to accelerate the transition and reduce the cost than to achieve a general consensus at home on the direction of our domestic and foreign policies.
While in today's complex world it is unlikely, if not impossible, for us here to achieve a national consensus on all aspects of foreign policy, better mutual understanding and support on the country's future international role should be effectively sought. Such support would not only decrease the danger that unwise foreign policy would backfire on the country, but also helps to give the new president an armory of tested policies to strengthen his capacity to face foreign policy challenges.
Susilo has hinted his administration would launch a series of bold new policies. This would lead to changes, some of which would be fundamental ones.
However, Susilo should not overlook at least three cautionary notes:
First, he should not undertake foreign policy changes simply for the sake of appearing different from his predecessor.
Second, he should remember that while Indonesia is perceived as the most influential country in the region, it continues to struggle for its economic recovery. This country must proceed with a degree of consistency in relations so as to maintain external resources for its economic development.
Third, Susilo's administration should beware of the "100 days syndrome", especially as it affects foreign policy, which would cause Susilo and his team to believe that if they have not made momentous decisions by the end of their first three months, they would fail in the next five years.
It is a political reality that foreign policy issues did not attract the attention of the presidential candidates during the election campaigns. But because foreign policy is indeed an instrument to promote and articulate national interests abroad, it is perhaps wise for one to call for a greater continuity of foreign policy insofar as it reflects an underlying consensus about our major foreign policy objectives.
Sudden basic shifts and changes in foreign policy could destabilize and disrupt the country.
Therefore, Susilo's foreign policy team should reach a consensus that the next administration's foreign policy must be built upon pragmatic, realistic and rational thought. This should then be translated into a fresh foreign policy agenda that is oriented toward overcoming our domestic problems.
The new president must have a good grasp of the country's international affairs and understand the importance of international links to the solution of our domestic problems. Coherence and consistency in foreign policy are best served if the president has only one principle lieutenant in that area, the minister for foreign affairs.

diplomasi indonesia,australia, timtim

Segitiga RI, Timtim, dan Australia
Oleh: Eddy Maszudi
ADA lima tantangan utama hubungan antara Republik Indonesia, Timor Lorosae, dan Australia pascakemerdekaan negeri Timor Lorosae, 20 Mei 2002. Tantangan pertama, Timor Lorosae atau Timtim sebagai negara baru harus mampu bersikap realistis, melupakan masa lalu yang buruk dan membangun masa depan dengan melihat bahwa negara kecil tersebut berada di antara dua negara besar, Indonesia dan Australia.
Sikap realistis seharusnya bisa tercermin dari sikap Timtim dalam rangka mempertahankan identitas Indonesia termasuk pemakaian bahasa Indonesia hingga menghormati bangsa Indonesia. Dalam menyikapi hubungan diplomasi Indonesia-Australia yang sering panas-dingin, Presiden Timtim Xanana Gusmao dapat memainkan peran sebagai pemecah kebekuan.
Dengan visi rekonsiliasi antarrakyat Timor yang terbelah, masa lalu yang penuh perbedaan ideologi, dan rekonsiliasi dengan Indonesia dalam rangka menciptakan babak baru bagi hubungan dua negara yang pernah menjadi satu. Sebagai pejuang kemerdekaan, Xanana harus menghadapi masalah rumit. Sebab, banyak pejuang kemerdekaan yang gagal ketika dipilih oleh rakyatnya menjadi pemimpin sipil. Lihat kegagalan Bung Karno dan Nur Misuari dalam mengendalikan pemerintahan sipil.
Kedua, Indonesia harus melihat ke depan daripada mencari kambing hitam untuk keterlepasan Timtim dari NKRI. Hal itu juga berlaku pada keluarga besar TNI dan Polri yang terpukul dari kekalahan kubu prootonomi dalam jajak pendapat yang dilakukan pemerintahan Habibie.
Indonesia mampu memainkan peran strategis dalam membangun negara Timor Lorosae. Sebab secara budaya, sosial, ekonomi, dan geografis stabilitas di Indonesia akan menentukan stabilitas Timtim yang berpenduduk 737.000 orang. Indonesia dan Timtim seharusnya mengambil jalan tengah dalam menyelesaikan masalah perbatasan, keberadaan 65.000 - 70.000 pengungsi asal Timtim di Indonesia, pembagian minyak di Celah Timor, hingga penyelesaian pelanggaran HAM yang dilakukan TNI di Timtim.
Campur Tangan
Ketiga, Australia yang mempunyai peran besar dalam mengusahakan kemerdekaan bangsa Timor tidak boleh campur tangan banyak dalam perumusan kebijakan luar negeri bangsa Timor dalam menentukan hubungan dengan Jakarta. Jika campur tangan Australia transparan sekali, rakyat Indonesia akan memandang bahwa negara Timor hanya boneka Australia dan Barat yang sengaja dijadikan ujung tombak dalam rangka memperlemah Republik Indonesia.
Keempat, sikap beberapa elite politik Timor Lorosae yang ingin menjadikan Portugis sebagai negara terdekat dan menghapus semua identitas Indonesia di sana harus dipikirkan kembali. Sebab, bergabungnya Timtim 1976-1999 dengan Indonesia telah memberikan makna yang cukup dalam bagi rakyat Timor. Apalagi mayoritas generasi muda di negara itu pernah belajar di Indonesia.
Kelima, sebagai negara baru yang miskin (pendapatan perkapita 200 dolar AS/tahun), Timtim tidak perlu melakukan kerja sama militer dengan AS, misalnya dengan memperbolehkan wilayah Timor sebagai pangkalan militer AS.Indonesia akan melihat keberadaan pangkalan militer asing di bumi Lorosae sebagai sebuah ancaman, sehingga akan terjadi konfrontasi antara Timtim dan Indonesia.
Rakyat Timor sekarang 737.000 orang dan masih ada 65.000 - 70.000 pengungsi asal Timtim di Indonesia merupakan masalah utama bangsa Timor dalam memberdayakan diri dan menata hubungan baik dengan Jakarta. Padahal, 85% kehidupan Timtim berada di bawah kemiskinan. Dengan hanya berpendapatan rata-rata 200 dolar AS per tahun, bangsa Timor sekarang bisa bertahan lantaran ada bantuan PBB. Selama pemerintahan transisi 1999-2002, negara Timor mendapat bantuan 523 juta dolar AS dari Australia, AS, Jepang, dan Bank Dunia. Bantuan tersebut belum berasal dari UNTAET yang setiap tahun mengeluarkan anggaran 65 juta dolar. Dengan demikian, kelangsungan hidup 2,5 tahun bangsa Timor lebih banyak di lembaga internasional yang tentu juga mempunyai hidden agenda tersendiri dalam memformat masa depannya.
Sebagai bangsa yang baru merdeka, masa depan Timtim lebih banyak ditentukan adanya hubungan baik dengan Indonesia dan Australia. Dengan adanya jaminan keamanan, negara Timor yang kaya akan tambang minyak di Celah Timor dan diduga di perut bumi negara ini ada deposit uranium. Akan tetapi potensi minyak, SDA yang bagus untuk kebun kakao, kopi dan peternakan tidak akan berkembang bila tidak ada jaminan keamanan.
Secara geostrategis, wilayah ini sangat baik untuk pangkalan militer. Sebab dengan adanya pangkalan militer AS misalnya, Negara Paman Sam itu akan mudah mengawasi ratusan perusahaan multinasional milik bangsanya yang tersebar di Papua, Jawa, Sumatera, Kalimantan, Filipina, Papua Nugini, dan Australia.
Pemerintah Timor diprediksikan baru dapat memberikan kontribusi keuangan bagi pembiayaan pembangunan pada 2005-2006. Pada periode itu Timor diharapkan akan menerima hasil 114 juta dolar AS dari proyek minyak di Laut Timor hasil kerja sama antara Darwin LNG, TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Co) dan Tokyo Gas Co (TGC).
Dengan demikian, untuk bisa melihat apakah Timtim bisa eksis dan mampu mewarnai hubungan regional antara Indonesia, Timor Lorosae, dan Australia hingga ASEAN baru bisa dilihat lima tahun ke depan.
Masa Depan
Dalam kerangka demokrasi hubungan segitiga tersebut akan bisa berjalan dengan baik. Sebab, Australia sebagai negara kaya dan demokratis akan memberikan perhatian lebih terhadap proses transisi menuju ke demokrasi di Indonesia dan Timor Lorosae. Dengan adanya sistem politik yang demokratis di ketiga negara tersebut, stabilitas bisa terjaga sehingga perdagangan internasional dapat berjalan. Australia bisa mengambil keuntungan dari sini.
Akan tetapi prioritas politik luar negeri Australia pasca-Tragedi 11 September 2001 yang cenderung ke AS dan Eropa serta meninggalkan Asia adalah sumber ancaman bagi pemulihan hubungan diplomasi Indonesia-Australia. Padahal, nilai ekspor Australia 60% ke negara-negara Asia. Agaknya Australia yang putih kurang bisa dijadikan sahabat baik bagi Indonesia.
Timor sebagai negara kecil seharusnya mampu menggunakan diplomasi sehingga pasang-surut hubungan diplomasi Indonesia-Australia tidak berimbas kepada stabilitas di Timor. Sikap Xanana Gusmao yang kooperatif dengan Jakarta adalah langkah awal paling bijaksana dalam membuka lembaran baru hubungan baik kedua negara.
Sementara itu, kehadiran Presiden Megawati pada 20 Mei 2002 di Timtim adalah sebuah keputusan realistis dan tepat dalam rangka menciptakan nuansa baru bagi hubungan segitiga Indonesia, Timor, dan Australia. Akan tetapi, bila Presiden Indonesia tidak jadi hadir maka rakyat Timor, Australia, dan dunia internasional masih mempertanyakan sikap Indonesia atas kemerdekaan bangsa Timor.(33j)
-Eddy Maszudi, pengamat masalah politik internasional dan Ketua Umum Centre for Strategic Development and International Research (CSDIR).

FN for SBY

The Jakarta Post, October 18, 2004Foreign-policy agenda for the new president
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is likely to be in charge of the country for the next five years following an official announcement by the General Elections Commission that he won support from three-fifths of the voters. Indonesia now stands at another crossroads; it is another time for leaders to be farsighted and to bring the country five years of better domestic security and improved prosperity.
The challenges Susilo will face are huge given that the country for the past few years has been beset by series of turbulent events. Often international players have considered Indonesia as either weak structurally or even on the brink of disintegration. The challenge is to build a "new century of Indonesia" by laying new foundations for a better future. But the way these challenges are met or ignored by the next president will certainly affect the lives of each and every Indonesian and our prospects in the years ahead.
Since Susilo's victory, public commentaries have been focusing much on the domestic challenges he is likely to face during his presidency. Although domestic problems would and should be Susilo's priority -- why he is avoiding foreign trips -- managing external challenges is as important as negotiating domestic ones. So, as we near the end of Megawati's administration, it is perhaps a good time for us to look at the foreign policy agenda and challenges for Susilo's government.
Consider the world we live in today. In Southeast Asia, we are at the initial stages in building a zone of peace and stability through the idea of the ASEAN Community; we are however only halfway toward building a strong, stable and integrated Asia-Pacific community. On a more global level, we are witnessing the continual rise of market democracies, bringing hopes of prosperity and new opportunities to many. Yet this promising era is not risk-free. A host of modern threats, from terrorism to people trafficking and arms smuggling, have also gone global in that they ignore national borders and thus undermine the wellbeing of our people and the country's security.
To meet the challenge, Susilo must first understand the nature of the change that surrounds us. He must acknowledge that in a rapidly changing and interdependent world the separation of national and international affairs is becoming blurred if not problematic. A more globalized world is bound to cause fragmentation on the one hand and integration on the other, either on a national or an international level. Judging from current developments, fragmentation it could be said, is the dominant trend in today's world politics.
On the foreign policy issue, Susilo once said that if elected he would protect national sovereignty, promote an active foreign policy and ensure that Indonesia would be in the frontline in the fight against terrorism. The essence of such promise is the national interest because of a considerably close link between those goals.
However, following up these objectives is certainly not enough for our foreign policy. To lead the country effectively, either at the national, regional or global level, Susilo must do two things at once. First, he must undertake the business of managing "crises" as they arise. Whether dealing with the possibility of a new outbreak of violence in Aceh or Papua, or responding to the future threat of terrorist attacks.
It is all too easy, and sometimes all too tempting, to let current emergencies dictate our foreign policy agenda. But the leadership in foreign policy means more than responding to the crisis and problems of the day. This leads us to the second aspect of Susilo's foreign policy leadership, namely anticipating problems the country will face down the road, making investments that will pay greater benefits or prevent greater costs in the future.
It is to say that even as Susilo's government deals with day-to-day events, it must also focus on long-term, strategic foreign policy goals. Susilo must capitalize on the gains the country has achieved from its international relations to build a much stronger and more respected Indonesia.
One knows that foreign policy challenges do not arise in neat five year cycles. Every administration inherits problems it must manage. Ours is no different. Here are some "construction projects" for Susilo's government for the next five years that transcend domestic and international interests:
(1) building an undivided and more democratic Indonesia;
(2) building a stronger shield against the forces of destruction;
(3) building a regional defense mechanism -- not a military one -- a platform that would guard and guide the realization of the ASEAN Community;
(4) building and expanding international links so as to better and effectively secure our resources abroad;
(5) building international coalitions to take on challenges that derive from transnational security issues; and
(6) promoting forces for multilateralism: This would include tough reforms at the UN forum. Indonesia's desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council must be seen within such reforms.
The peaceful direct presidential election here has given birth to a new president. Susilo is likely to be the central focus here and abroad at least for the next five years. The world, particularly Southeast Asia, will be anxious to see his foreign policy goals in action. Though some may appear ambitious, the above goals are feasible enough -- they could be executed by Susilo's foreign policy team.
The biggest enemy to success is inaction.
If Susilo's foreign policy objective is to protect the country's interests and to strengthen its international position, then the country requires active and wider international engagement.

myanmar mengalah

Birma, yang dikritik dunia karena situasi demokrasi dan hak-hak asasi manusia, memutuskan tidak menjabat pemimpin bergilir ASEAN tahun 2006. Dengan demikian berakhirlah perselisihan berbulan-bulan antara anggota organisasi tersebut. Apa sebenarnya alasan di belakang keputusan ini. Kami nanyakan kepada peneliti utama LIPI tentang Asean, Alfitra Sofi Salam.
Menjaga keutuhan ASEANAlfitra Salam [AS]: "Ya, saya rasa pertimbangan bermula untuk tidak memimpin ASEAN, saya kira pertama untuk menjaga keutuhan ASEAN sendiri. Karena kalau misalnya Birma tetap bertahan untuk memimpin ASEAN, saya kira ASEAN maupun organisasi anggota ASEAN akan mendapat kritikan dari negara-negara Eropa dan negara-negara lainnya".
"Kemudian yang kedua, saya melihat bahwa ini memperlihatkan bahwa Birma sangat memperhatikan, dalam artian, tidak peduli dengan desakan-desakan terhadap pembela demokrasi, seperti Aung San Suu Kyi".
"Dan ini menunjukkan juga bahwa pemerintahan Birma, saya kira, memang sangat sulit untuk diintervensi, dalam artian, memberikan ruang gerak kepada pembela atau penggerak demokrasi seperti Aung San Suu Kyi itu".
Radio Nederland [RN]: "Jadi ini keputusan Birma sendiri ya Pak?"
AS: "Ya, Birma saya kira lebih bagus mengambil keputusan sendiri dibandingkan jika keputusan itu berdasarkan rekomendasi-rekomendasi negara anggota ASEAN. Saya kira dia juga ingin jangan sampai ASEAN ini pecah. Ini saya kira juga cukup bagus".
RN: "Soalnya ASEAN kan menganut prinsip non-intervensi. Jadi negara-negara anggotanya tidak mencampuri urusan intern masing-masing ya?"
AS: "Ya betul".
Sinyal dari IndonesiaRN: "Apa peran Indonesia di sini?"
AS: "Saya kira Indonesia sejak awal sudah mengeluarkan sinyal agar Birma tidak memimpin ASEAN. Saya kira itu suatu sikap yang sesuai dengan sikap Indonesia yang sudah reformis dan memperjuangkan demokrasi".
"Saya kira Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono juga sudah memberikan beberapa sinyal juga, pernyataan, biarlah Myanmar itu berkorban untuk tidak menjadi pemimpin ASEAN sehingga tidak mendapat kritik-kritik dari luar".
RN: "Tapi bagaimana Indonesia bisa berperan demikian? Apakah ini tidak menyebabkan Indonesia makin rentan saja pada tekanan internasional?"
AS: "Saya kira pernyataan atau sinyal pemerintah Indonesia, saya kira tidak akan menimbulkan reaksi internasional. Karena sejak awal pemerintah Indonesia sudah secara serius mendesak agar Myanmar membuka lebar-lebar pintu demokrasi".
Malaysia dan Indonesia sangat reformisRN: "Juga dikatakan bahwa kasus Myanmar menunjukkan adanya perselisihan antara anggota ASEAN. Karena antara lain Indonesia dan Malaysia mendesak Birma untuk melakukan reformasi. Sementara Kamboja dan Vietnam tidak ingin mencampuri urusan intern Birma. Bagaimana ini?"
AS: "Ya, perbedaan atau friksi internal organisasi ASEAN, saya kira sangat wajar sekali terjadi. Karena bagaimana pun juga Vietnam dan Kamboja boleh dikatakan secara geografis, dan kerja sama antara Birma dan itu cukup besar".
"Kemudian yang kedua saya melihat bahwa memang Malaysia sama Indonesia memang sebagai negara yang sejak awal memperjuangkan demokrasi, mau tidak mau, ini dianggap sebagai upaya memperlihatkan kepada dunia internasional bahwa Malaysia dan Indonesia juga sangat reformis. Jadi friksi ini saya kira tidak akan membuat ASEAN itu pecah".
Berkat diplomasi Indonesia dan MalaysiaRN: "Juga diumumkan bahwa Amerika akan memberlakukan beberapa sanksi terhadap ASEAN, apabila Birma tetap memutuskan memimpin ASEAN. Di antaranya resolusi untuk memperpanjang embargo impor barang-barang produk dari Asia. Apakah ini tidak berbahaya bagi Indonesia?"
AS: "Saya kira kecaman Amerika memang, kalau itu sungguh terjadi, saya kira memang berbahaya. Oleh karena itu saya kira Indonesia, Malaysia dan juga negara-negara ASEAN lain ingin mencari jalan bagaimana menyelamatkan ASEAN, tanpa adanya friksi-friksi yang luar biasa".
"Saya kira mundurnya Birma sebagai ketua ASEAN, saya kira suatu diplomasi Indonesia dan Malaysia yang saya kira cukup luar biasa".
Demikian peneliti utama LIPI tentang Asean, Alfitra

Indonesia be more realistic

The Jakarta Post, October 23, 2004It's time for Indonesia to be more realistic
The government of Australia recently considered a new security pact with Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation. Combating terrorism jointly was perhaps the rationale behind such an idea. The agreement would be based on a memorandum of understanding between the two countries, signed after the October 2002 Bali bombings.
The current debate on Australia-Indonesia security links dates back to 1995 when the so-called Agreement on Maintaining Security between the two countries was arranged by then-president Soeharto and then-Labor Party prime minister Paul Keating. Such security deal committed the two countries to ministerial consultations about security, increasing cooperation and consultation in the event of a threat to either country, or regional security.
Indonesia however, unilaterally canceled the agreement during the tension over independence of East Timor in 1999, when Australia led a UN Peacekeeping force in East Timor. Since then, official military to military contacts have been absent.
The debate over the issue of Australia-Indonesia security pact emerged again when Susilo, as the coordinating minister for political and security affairs, paid a visit to Prime Minister of Australia, Howard, in October last year. Susilo was reported as saying that a defense pact with Australia was needed to promote the fight against terrorism. The Australian side saw this as a clear sign of Indonesia's strong willingness to "ally" itself with Australia, particularly in the fight against global terrorism, as Indonesia itself is accused to be the spot for terrorist activities, as well as facing grave threat from terrorism.
The government of Australia clearly believes the election of Susilo as president has the potential to usher a new era cooperation between two of the region's most powerful countries.
If such an idea is to be realized, assuming that both sides need a stronger political and legal ground to fight terrorism, it will certainly contribute significantly to the strengthening of Australia-Indonesia bilateral security relations.
However, many here perceived the idea of a security pact between Australia and Indonesia as something too far-fetched and impossible to realize and it therefore should not be initiated. The main reason was Indonesia's strong adherence to the policy of nonalignment, one that suggests detachment of the policy from being linked to the policy of certain western powers. Other reasons cited was that too close a relationship with U.S. allies wouldn't do any good to Indonesia's foreign relations.
There is no doubt that Indonesia is one of the co-founders of the Non-Aligned Movement NAM and it consequently pursued its foreign policy, at least in the eyes of those in the government, within such a policy framework. There is nothing wrong with this and there is even nothing wrong to suggest that a security pact with Australia would run against such principle.
One, however, found the reality that there exists a political alignment within NAM itself. Pakistan security alignment with the U.S. can be cited as one example. Thus, a nonaligned policy principle shouldn't in any way serve as a political barrier for a given country to expand security relations with major power, particularly, when they face common security problems like terrorism.
Judging the current changes in our strategic milieu where terrorism and other nontraditional security issues posed a grave and continuous threat to the security of the state, perhaps it is time for Indonesia, under the administration of Susilo, to be more realistic in its gesture toward a proposal of an Australia-Indonesia security pact. Terrorist attacks have made a new pact necessary between the two countries. This is not to suggest that Indonesia should abandon its policy of non-alignment.
So if one is to judge objectively the proposed pact, one would conclude that security for Australia and Indonesia is not simply about responding to terrorist threats, but about external threats in general. It is about the whole strategic environment of the region and about foreign policy of the two countries. Thus, in the era of global interdependence, the proposed pact is about the way Australia and Indonesia organized themselves, jointly or individually, particularly when facing terrorist threats.
Australia wants from Indonesia something more substantial and perhaps, would want it to be more than just symbolic. It will be symbolic anyway, but symbolism is important in international relations. The new government of Susilo shouldn't turn down Australia's proposal, given the fact that Indonesia is in dire need for an "extra arm" to combat global terrorism, if terrorism is to be perceived as the main focus of their security cooperation.
The leaders of Australia and Indonesia both share the responsibility to project a more promising regional stability, as well as constructive bilateral security relations. Thus a security treaty or agreement is not at all a bad thing to pursue. If Indonesia and Australia decided that they really want to do something like a pact for example, then they might want to incorporate each other's counterterrorism works and then look at some broader aspects of the two countries security relationships.
So, the treaty, if it is realized, sets up a whole frame of reference for future security relationships between Australia and Indonesia. This will be a contemporary treaty made for contemporary reasons, for the right reasons and it is something which is going to add strength and value to both countries. It is definitely going to bring a sense of security to Indonesia as well as to Australia.

SBY ke Australia

Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono disambut positif di Australia. Menurut Perdana Menteri John Howard ini membuka era baru hubungan kedua negara. Selain itu Canberra berniat mengambil hati ASEAN lewat pertolongan Jakarta. Berikut keterangan Andi Yusran, dosen ilmu politik internasional Universitas Riau.
Ekonomi dan keamananAndi Yusran [AY]: "Saya kira dalam beberapa masa sebelum ini, hubungan antara kedua negara berada dalam posisi yang terburuk. Dibanding dengan jaman-jaman sebelumnya ketika Orde Baru berkuasa. Selepas SBY naik, inilah momentum terbaik dalam rangka mempererat kembali hubungan kedua belah pihak ".
Radio Nederland [RN]: "Tetapi apakah ada arah kebijakan baru yang diambil?"
AY: "Dalam banyak hal, pemerintahan SBY-Kalla memiliki beberapa tujuan strategis. Terutama di dua hal pada masalah ekonomi dan soal keamanan. Itu yang menjadi inti pembicaraan dan menjadi bagian daripada strategi diplomasi Indonesia dalam kerangka hubungan dengan Australia. Masalah ekonomi saya kira ke depan Australia tentu diharapkan banyak bermain dalam rangka mengembangkan investasi. Di sisi lain dari aspek keamanan, terutama terjadinya kasus Ambalat ini juga bisa menjadi kemenangan diplomasi Indonesia dalam forum internasional. Karena selama ini Indonesia kurang bermain pada forum internasional. Karena terlalu banyak persoalan dalam negeri yang menjadi masalah".Saling membutuhkanRN: "Pak SBY juga menawarkan diri untuk memperkenalkan kembali Australia ke dalam lingkungan ASEAN. Bagaimana ini menurut bapak, apakah ini suatu tugas baru bagi Indonesia?
AY: "Di sana nanti nilai tawarnya. Di satu sisi Indonesia butuh beberapa hal dengan Australia, di sisi lain juga Australia butuh dengan Indonesia. Pada masa-masa sebelum reformasi Indonesia adalah termasuk negara terkuat di Asia Tenggara. Itu menjadi sesuatu yang sangat ditakuti oleh Australia waktu itu. Ketika masa transisi Indonesia dan beberapa negara Asia Tenggara mulai collapse, kemudian ditambah lagi dengan politik luar negeri Amerika. Dan di mana Australia nampaknya ingin menjadi wakil Amerika di Asia Tenggara. Dan itu menimbulkan kritikan oleh beberapa negara Asia Tenggara. Terutama Malaysia misalnya ".
"Jadi hubungan Australia dengan negara-negara Asia Tenggara buruk, karena adanya persepsi bagi negara Asia Tenggara seakan-akan Australia ingin menjadi kaki tangan Amerika. Kasus seperti ini saya kira yang akan dimanfaatkan Australia untuk mendekati beberapa negara ASEAN, melalui jalur diplomasi dengan Indonesia".Politik kooperatifRN: "Perdana Menteri Malaysia juga akan mengadakan kunjungan resmi ke Australia. Yang pertama dalam 20 tahun. Apakah perbaikan hubungan antara Malaysia dengan Australia akan berakibat positif buat Indonesia?"
AY: "Kalau memang diisi dalam kerangka kerjasama bilateral ataupun multilateral, saya kira menguntungkan semua pihak. Ke depan, pola kerjasama itu akan mengarah ke kooperatif. Negara-negara Asia Tenggara agak kritis terhadap Australia. Abdullah Badawi agak sedikit low profile dan ini memungkinkan Malaysia kembali lebih bisa berdekatan dengan Australia khususnya untuk memajukan kerjasama ke dua belah pihak".
"Saya melihat arah politik ke depan tampaknya akan pada politik kooperatif kembali antara Australia dan Asia Tenggara. Bagaimanapun Australia melihat bahwa negara-negara Asia Tenggara termasuk Indonesia dan Malaysia sangat penting artinya bagi Australia. Australia selama ini disimbolkan atau dicap sebagai wakil negara super power dan itu kurang menguntungkan dalam banyak segi khususnya dalam masalah perdagangan dengan Asia Tenggara ".
Kebijakan luar negeri AustraliaRN: "Australia ini dikenal selalu membela pihak separatisme di Indonesia. Bagaimana sekarang?"
AY: "Lawatan SBY ke sana itu dalam kerangka menarik perhatian Australia supaya Australia jangan lagi melakukan 'kesalahan' seperti yang pernah dilakukannya ketika mendukung Timor Timur merdeka. Saya kira Australia tidak punya kepentingan terhadap Aceh atau daerah-daerah lainnya. Ke depan Australia mungkin tidak akan melibatkan diri mendukung gerakan-gerakan separatis di Indonesia ".
RN: "Boleh dibilang kebijakan luar negeri Australia berubah, begitu?"
AY: "Karena memang kepentingan strategis Australia juga terjadi pergeseran terutama dengan selesainya persoalan Timor Timur. Di sisi lain, Australia berkepentingan terhadap Asia Tenggara ".
ASEAN dan AustraliaRN: "Menurut Bapak sesudah kunjungan SBY dan Badawi nanti di Australia, apakah Australia boleh menghadiri sidang ASEAN yang berikut?"
AY: "Saya kira arahannya akan ke sana. Australia adalah partner bagi negara-negara Asia Tenggara di mana pada pertemuan-pertemuan puncak sebelumnya, partner-partner seperti Australia, Jepang, dan Korea Selatan itu selalu aktif dalam setiap pertemuan. Dan di sanalah kerjasama multilateral dibangun ".
"Beberapa kasus yang terjadi akhir-akhir ini terutama dengan politik luar negeri Amerika di Asia Tenggara dan Asia, kasus-kasus teroris berat dan sebagainya, itu membawa Australia menjadi agak sedikit terpinggir ".
"Ada semacam momentum baru pendekatan kedua belah pihak antara negara-negara Asia Tenggara dengan Australia sendiri. Ke depan saya kira, kooperatif antara Asia Tenggara dengan Australia akan terbangun ".
Demikian Andi Yusran, dosen ilmu politik internasional Universitas Riau.

ASEAN summit

The Jakarta Post, November 26, 2004ASEAN summit more than a ceremonial occassion
The 10th summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Vientiane, which marks the beginning of the Lao chairmanship, will likely be the most important international event in Laos's recent history, as well as raising the image and position of Laos in the international arena.
The Vientiane summit will be closely watched by the international community, especially ASEAN's immediate neighbors, as it moves itself into an integrated regional community by 2020. The idea of an ASEAN Community will definitely be the main theme throughout the summit and one that will provide the basis for the direction of ASEAN and its future activities. Thus, the summit will be an important venue to express further its commitment for a change.
ASEAN's regional diplomatic moves will not end in Vientiane, but will go beyond it if ASEAN shows a consistent committed in its strategic platform and has success in building its regional identity.
As in the previous summits, the agenda of this summit also has been prepared by bureaucrats through a series of meetings. So, there is virtually no possibility of a summit failure. The summit seemed was intentionally designed not to become a problem solver. Real debate among ASEAN leaders in Vientiane is therefore unlikely to happen.
It will also be less burdened by the need to adopt new regional policies, because the Vientiane Action Program (VAP), as a successor of the Hanoi Plan of Action, was already thoroughly discussed during the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta this year.
Many critics pointed out that the Vientiane summit would serve as a forum for discussion, not necessarily to give a new orientation or substance to ASEAN and not even to deviate from an agreed upon common stand. It may just end up as a rubber-stamp forum, because the official negotiations will, in fact, be concluded at lower levels.
There is nothing wrong with this, because the regional grouping's overall performance will be evaluated not on the extent to which its bureaucrats have helped direct ASEAN's orientation as reflected in the official documents, but more on how the top leaders perceive the current and future regional strategic problems. If the plan for the ASEAN Community needs fundamental changes, in response to changes in the way the leaders see regional problems, then the Vientiane summit would have to come out with fresh and bold policies as how the changes should really benefit the group's members and the region as a whole.
The Vientiane summit should not serve only to accommodate differences. In light of the enormous expectations from the public in the region, ASEAN leaders might be tempted to compromise with "false solutions".
The ASEAN 10th summit will be held under the theme of promoting an active and secure ASEAN family by boosting solidarity, economic cooperation and progress. The summit is scheduled to focus on comprehensively enhancing ASEAN's alignment, boosting cooperation in eastern Asia as well as India, Australia and New Zealand.
"Boosting ASEAN+3 cooperation" will be the theme of the ASEAN + 3 Summit Meeting (with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), while the ASEAN+1 Summit Meetings (with India) will be entitled "Deepening Partnership".
The Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) in the 2004-2010 period along with an action plan for ASEAN socio-cultural community, an action plan to implement a joint declaration on ASEAN-China strategic partnerships for peace and prosperity, an ASEAN-Japan joint declaration on cooperation in fighting international terrorism, a joint declaration on 30th anniversary of ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand dialog partnership, an ASEAN-India partnership declaration for peace, development and prosperity and an ASEAN -the Republic of Korea joint declaration on comprehensive partnership cooperation are scheduled to be discussed and passed at the meetings.
The above plans clearly reflect the fact that ASEAN has stretched its arms much further and has served as a kind of regional magnet in which other external actors cannot avoid but to be part of ASEAN's long-term regional activities. This is the kind of regional dynamism the Vientiane summit hopes to display to the region, meaning that ASEAN's long-term diplomatic activities will be centered particularly on the above ventures.
If ASEAN is successful in establishing the ASEAN Community by 2020, it is assumed that ASEAN's external relations will also be stable and thus shape ASEAN's long-term image. Thus, the Vientiane summit is tasked to map out long-term strategic plans, one that would not only guarantee the realization of the ASEAN plan of action at least until 2010, but also provide a stronger political and security basis for future diplomatic activities inside as well as outside the region.
The summit will be highly valued as it takes place at a time when the world is eager to promote global free trade as well as seeking a stronger collaborative effort in the fight against international terrorism and when ASEAN itself is set to sideline their differences in certain policy issues. ASEAN's leaders should stay together within such a framework.
ASEAN leaders should also see to it that the Vientiane summit remains instrumental in developing long-term regional security and stability. It is thus an important stabilizing element in the regional order. But if ASEAN is to make the best use of its coming summit, it must steer clear of being seen merely as a ceremonial get-together. Focusing only on the physical meeting without much reference to the wider diplomatic context as mentioned above will not do any good for ASEAN's long-term vision and objectives.

daya tawar diplomasi indonesia

Membangun Kembali Daya Tawar yang Pudar....
Oleh: Rakaryan Sukarjaputra
Peran politik luar negeri dalam membangun dan mempertahankan eksistensi Republik Indonesia, sejak tahun 1945 hingga sekarang, tidak pernah diragukan. Sebagai komponen di dalam negara, itu bagian tak terpisahkan sekaligus melengkapi kehidupan perpolitikan dalam negeri.
Menteri Luar Negeri Hassan Wirajuda kerap kali mengungkapkan bahwa ”kekuatan” politik luar negeri sebuah negara sangat ditentukan oleh kekuatan dalam negeri itu sendiri. Jika kondisi di dalam negerinya buruk, penuh dengan hal yang dianggap negatif, ”daya tawar” negara itu dalam berdiplomasi dengan negara lain pun akan jauh berkurang.
Kenyataan itulah yang harus dialami politik luar negeri Indonesia, yang sejak tahun 1945 sampai tahun 1990-an tampak begitu cemerlang, tetapi kemudian ikut terpuruk menyusul krisis ekonomi yang diikuti tumbangnya Orde Baru, yang juga memperlihatkan berbagai keburukan yang sebelumnya tersembunyikan.
”Praktis dalam tiga tahun, setelah 1998 itu, kita sebenarnya absen dari pergaulan internasional karena kesibukan kita untuk membangun kembali di dalam. Oleh karena itu, sekarang kita harus mengejar kembali apa yang sempat tertinggal itu,” ungkap Hassan beberapa waktu lalu.
Setelah melewati fase setengah abad pertama, praktis jajaran diplomat luar negeri Indonesia sekarang ini dalam fase membangun kembali ”daya tawar” dalam berhubungan dengan negara-negara lain. Akan tetapi, lingkungan di dalam negeri yang belum sepenuhnya kondusif dan lingkungan internasional yang juga tengah berubah membuat jalan untuk menegakkan kembali ”kewibawaan” diplomasi luar negeri Indonesia tidaklah mudah.
Faktor lingkungan internasional itu antara lain muncul dan semakin menguatnya ancaman global baru yang disebut terorisme, tidak terlihatnya lagi perimbangan kekuatan global yang dulu dicerminkan melalui Blok Barat dan Blok Timur, serta terpaan arus informasi yang nyaris tak terbendung lagi dengan berbagai dampak baik-buruknya.
Obyek dan subyek
Dalam kaitan dengan isu terorisme, malangnya, Indonesia bukan hanya menjadi target serangan, tetapi sekaligus juga ”subyek” karena banyak pelaku terorisme ternyata adalah orang Indonesia sendiri. Bahkan bukan hanya itu, beberapa gelintir orang Indonesia pun dilaporkan terkait dengan jaringan terorisme regional dan internasional.
Pada isu terorisme ini saja, sangat tidak mudah bagi jajaran diplomat Indonesia untuk memperbaiki citra Indonesia yang oleh beberapa pihak dituding sebagai sarang teroris. Prestasi Indonesia menyelenggarakan pemilu yang demokratis dan tanpa gejolak belum sepenuhnya bisa memperbaiki kerusakan akibat peledakan bom di Bali, Hotel JW Marriott, dan di depan pagar Kedutaan Besar Australia di Jakarta.
Ketika kekuatan dunia terbagi dalam dua ekstrem, Blok Barat dan Blok Timur, Indonesia bersama sejumlah negara lain yang tidak ingin terbawa-bawa ke dalam salah satu blok masih bisa ”bermain” dan muncul sebagai ”kekuatan alternatif” melalui Gerakan Nonblok, G-77, dan lain- lain.
Posisi politis Indonesia pun menjadi penting bagi kedua blok itu mengingat kondisi dan posisi geografis Indonesia yang cukup memikat serta potensi ekonominya yang besar.
Kini, ketika salah satu blok sudah praktis hilang, negara-negara ”netral” seperti Indonesia tidak mudah untuk berperan di tengah sangat dominannya Amerika Serikat dan sekutu-sekutunya. Ditambah lagi kondisi ekonomi, sosial-politik, maupun pertahanan-keamanan Indonesia tidak terlihat sebaik dan setangguh dulu.
Keterbukaan informasi global yang kini tidak bisa dicegah lagi oleh siapa pun semakin membuat aspek diplomasi menghadapi tantangan berat. Dulu, para diplomat Indonesia masih bisa berkilah, menutupi fakta-fakta buruk dari sebuah peristiwa demi nama baik bangsa dan negara, dan alasan-alasan itu diterima karena sulitnya mendapatkan informasi pembanding.
Kini, hal seperti itu sulit sekali dilakukan karena fakta-fakta buruk tersebut pasti sudah diketahui banyak orang melalui berbagai cara penyebaran informasi yang dulu tidak pernah ada.
Dalam sejumlah peristiwa, tidak jarang masyarakat umum justru mendapatkan informasi lebih awal daripada jajaran diplomat. Alhasil, cara berdiplomasi pun tidak bisa lagi dilakukan seperti dulu karena bisa saja dianggap ”asal bunyi” dan tidak kredibel.
”Dulu kinerja para diplomat Indonesia bisa dengan mudah dianggap sebagai prestasi besar karena informasi sifatnya lebih satu arah. Sekarang, kinerja para diplomat yang lebih kurang sama, bahkan lebih, mungkin dinilai biasa-biasa saja karena kita punya banyak informasi pembandingnya,” ungkap Sekretaris Jenderal Departemen Luar Negeri Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat.
Oleh karena itu, membuat perbandingan kinerja jajaran diplomat luar negeri Indonesia sebelum 50 tahun kemerdekaan, dengan kinerja saat memasuki 60 tahun kemerdekaan, ini tidak mudah karena kondisi di dalam dan sekelilingnya yang terus berdinamika.
Lingkaran ASEAN
Menyadari tidak cukup kuatnya daya tawar dan telah berubahnya lingkungan global, praktis jajaran diplomat Indonesia sekarang ini kembali ke tahapan membangun sosok diplomasi Indonesia dari lingkaran yang kecil terus hingga ke yang besar. Lingkaran terkecil itu adalah ASEAN, yang selalu disebut sebagai corner-stone (batu pijakan) politik luar negeri Indonesia.
Konferensi Tingkat Tinggi ASEAN di Bali tahun 2003, yang menghasilkan Bali Concord II, merupakan pencapaian penting jajaran diplomat Indonesia yang banyak ”menentukan” transformasi ASEAN menuju sebuah komunitas yang kokoh pada tahun 2020.
Meski harus diakui bahwa Indonesia belum sepenuhnya bisa memulihkan posisinya sebagai ”pemimpin” ASEAN, gagasan-gagasan Indonesia di ASEAN kini kembali banyak dijadikan landasan pemikiran negara-negara anggota ASEAN lainnya.
Keberhasilan untuk tampil kembali di ASEAN itu patut dihargai karena ASEAN yang sekarang bukan lagi ASEAN pada tahun 1980-an dan awal 1990-an, yang jumlahnya lebih sedikit dan relatif sejajar dalam banyak hal.
ASEAN yang sekarang adalah ASEAN dengan 10 negara, di mana empat anggota barunya terbilang agak ketinggalan dibandingkan dengan enam anggota lainnya. Dengan jumlah yang lebih besar, persepsi, pendapat, dan kepentingan pun menjadi lebih beragam sehingga proses mencapai konsensus tidak lagi semudah dulu.
Belum lagi persoalan di antara negara-negara anggota ASEAN sendiri, yang dulu bisa dipendam dengan baik, kini semuanya tampil ke permukaan. Citra ASEAN, yang dulu terkesan solid, kini semakin luntur. Unsur ”senioritas” di antara pimpinan negara anggota ASEAN yang dulu membantu mudahnya mencapai kesepakatan kini telah hilang.
Arus informasi yang lebih terbuka juga membuat semakin banyak ”benturan” di antara negara-negara anggota ASEAN terlihat ke permukaan. Kondisi ini membuat tugas jajaran diplomat Indonesia di tingkat ASEAN jauh lebih berat ketimbang dulu.
Dalam lingkaran yang lebih besar, para diplomat Indonesia telah mencoba menghidupkan kembali semangat Asia-Afrika yang praktis ”nyaris padam” di tengah arus perubahan global yang sangat kencang ini. Memanfaatkan momentum 50 tahun Konferensi Asia-Afrika, para diplomat Indonesia berusaha keras membangun kembali citra Indonesia di kalangan negara-negara Asia-Afrika.
Begitu juga di forum PBB, beberapa diplomat Indonesia telah tampil sebagai pemimpin sidang, bahkan pemimpin Komisi Hak Asasi Manusia PBB. Pemikiran diplomat Indonesia mengenai reformasi PBB juga turut menyumbang pembaruan lembaga dunia itu.
Di sisi lain, hendaknya juga tidak dilupakan peran jajaran diplomat Indonesia dalam menangkis berbagai potensi tercerai-berainya negara kesatuan yang luas ini. Mulai dari isu Aceh, Maluku, hingga terakhir isu Papua (Irian Jaya). Padahal, di tengah kondisi domestik yang kurang kondusif, sesungguhnya kemungkinan pecahnya Indonesia tidaklah kecil. Kenyataan bahwa hingga saat ini wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia masih 99 persen utuh, hanya kehilangan Timor Timur seiring dengan ”kejatuhan” Indonesia, juga merupakan sumbangsih penting jajaran diplomat Indonesia.
Semua itu menunjukkan bahwa sebenarnya telah cukup banyak upaya dilakukan jajaran diplomat Indonesia untuk menampilkan kembali sosok diplomasi Indonesia yang ”kuat” dan ”patut dihitung” di tengah arus perubahan global.
Meski demikian, harus diakui juga bahwa suara Indonesia dalam berbagai fora regional maupun internasional belum lagi sekuat dulu. Hal itu karena pencarian bentuk paling pas dari kebijakan luar negeri ”bebas-aktif” di lingkungan dunia yang sangat dinamis masih terus berproses.

singapore diplomacy

A treaty and a message
P.S. SURYANARAYANA in Singapore
The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with Singapore, which combines liberalised commercial transactions in goods and services with two-way investment flows in untapped areas, is also a signal from India to other members of ASEAN about its credentials as a potential economic partner.
S. SUBRAMANIUM Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with his Singapore counterpart, Lee Hsien Loong, before signing the trade treaty in New Delhi.
A "VERY big psychological step" for India. This is how Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has described his country's Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with New Delhi.
The accord, which Lee and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed in New Delhi on June 29, truly signifies a new direction in India's economic diplomacy. The CECA is New Delhi's first overarching economic pact with any country. It combines the essence of liberalised commercial transactions in goods and services with two-way investment flows in untapped areas. Besides, it creates the political ambience for exploring the possibility of selective but high-degree exchanges in science and technology, inclusive of exchanges in the sensitive domain of defence, on the basis of mutual interest.
Irrelevant to the importance of this immense framework is the fact that Singapore is just a city-state while India is a huge subcontinent. Relevant, however, is the attention that Singapore commands on the international stage as a dynamic economy and even as "an exceptional state", as Michael Leifer, a long-time observer of the South-East Asian scene, portrayed it.
Singapore's strategic location, at a critical intersection of international commerce and in the geo-strategic vicinity of India and China, is a widely recognised factor. No less noteworthy is the way in which the city-state tries to maintain close security links with the United States without becoming its "ally". At the same time, Singapore seeks to be on the right side of evolving history by enhancing its ties with both China and India, while not neglecting the more immediate environment of South-East Asia. These are empirical facts which do not have to be romanticised, or even looked at with scepticism, in order to be seen as being important to countries like India.
Not surprisingly in this context, Lee noted with satisfaction, on the eve of the signing of the CECA, that the accord was "not a partisan matter" in the Indian political domain. Coincidentally but topically, the CECA was signed even as the Congress-led government in New Delhi came under potent and spectacular fire, notably from the Left parties, on certain crucial aspects of its overall economic policy and its foreign policy.
With Manmohan Singh having joined Lee in seeing the CECA as a pioneering step in India's economic diplomacy, what does a reality check show?
Integral to the CECA is a wide array of established practices and proposed initiatives, which range from dispute settlement arrangements and a review mechanism to an updated avoidance of double-taxation and other measures. However, the political importance of the CECA goes beyond the nitty-gritty of a complex agreement that can be translated into action with imagination on both sides.
From New Delhi's standpoint, the CECA is a positive signal to the other members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) about India's credentials as a potential economic partner. Also in focus now are India's willingness and ability to navigate the intricacies of dealing with countries that had often seen it as a lackadaisical player in the harsh international economic arena. Some of these countries, in ASEAN and beyond, were even used to viewing India as a vibrant democracy that did not, however, care to practise the principles of a "free market economy".
This perception is adequately addressed in Lee's perception of India's CECA-related move. Lee said: "It is a very big psychological step: to go from your old policy of substantial self-sufficiency, now to one where you want to link up, open up, your markets in a controlled sort of way and encourage greater linkages and exchanges. And, I think, the groundwork is laid for agreements with many other countries."
Noteworthy is the inherent political nuance in Lee's observation. India's egalitarian economic priorities at home and diplomacy abroad are summed up, with a great deal of political sensitivity, as the "old policy of substantial self-sufficiency". This view steers clear of criticism, often heard on the global circuit in the past, about India's alleged anachronism of "socialism".
TWO aspects of India's CECA-related diplomacy have come in for special notice on the ASEAN scene. Both can benefit New Delhi.
First, Singapore's decision to be the first country to sign a comprehensive economic pact with India is seen as the culmination of an active diplomatic process, involving "due diligence", on the part of the free-market-savvy city-state. The argument is that Singapore, an acknowledged international financial market with "free enterprise" practices, would not have done a deal with India without being reasonably sure of its implementation in the specific context of India's economic mores of growth with social justice at home and fair play in international commerce and other related activities.
The second but not the lesser observation is about the CECA-related "spin-off" that India can hope to generate in the ASEAN context and elsewhere. The reasoning is based on the acknowledgement that India, regarded globally as an astute player that relies on the power of argument, has done its own assessments with as much "due diligence" as Singapore. So, India may be able to project the CECA as a model while negotiating economic pacts with other states, especially in the ASEAN setting.
Closely related to this "spin-off value" of the CECA is the manner in which India's framework accord with Thailand on trade issues, signed in 2003, ran into rough weather. The causes need not necessarily imply that either India or Thailand, or indeed both, had not adequately anticipated the likely pitfalls while being eager to clinch an accord in time for the prime ministerial visit to Bangkok in October 2003.
However, the fact remains that Thailand Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra said that "part of [his] mission to India [a meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on June 3] this time [has been] to reinvigorate our current FTA [free trade agreement] negotiation process". A "commitment to pursue an FTA [with India] by 2010 remains our goal", Thaksin emphasised in the context of the unforeseen difficulties in the implementation of the relevant framework accord.
With Malaysia, a key ASEAN member, and Australia having evinced a great deal of interest in entering into economic cooperation agreements with India, not restricted just to trade, the CECA-linked "spin-off" will be a major issue.
With India having already initiated a serious process of negotiations with the wider ASEAN itself for strong economic links to be underwritten through a detailed accord, the "feel good" factor that the CECA can generate among the group's members in their collective talks with New Delhi is another likely opportunity for Indian diplomacy, according to regional officials and analysts.
On the purely India-Singapore front, the city-state, for long a trader with no import duties except on tobacco products, alcoholic products and motor vehicles, will benefit immensely from the CECA as New Delhi throws open over 500 items for duty-free entry under the "early harvest" scheme. However, as Finance Minister P. Chidambaram had said during the final stages of the two-year-long and often-tough negotiations, the principles that drove the parleys were not one of using a golden scale to measure whether Singapore would gain a few grams more or whether India should get some grains more.
Not surprisingly, Singapore, which had already signed FTAs with both the U.S. and Japan, tends to see the CECA as a new window of opportunity to upscale its engagement with India beyond the purely economic domain. Defence-related research is being mentioned as a possibility, while the accord itself was fashioned in a climate of incremental interactions across a wide spectrum, ranging from education and culture to the defence cooperation agreement of 2003 and beyond, at another level. All three wings of Singapore's defence forces have held exercises with India.
The city-state is also keen that New Delhi plays an appropriate role in a "creative" fashion in the maintenance of security along the Straits of Malacca. This narrow waterway, whose littoral states are Singapore and Malaysia besides Indonesia, is a vital sea lane for global trade and it is vulnerable to not only pirate attacks but also, potentially, terrorist strikes.
Within the larger regional context, Singapore has played a prime role in influencing ASEAN to extend a collective invitation to India to the inaugural East Asia summit, slated to be held in Kuala Lumpur later this year. The other non-ASEAN participants will be China, Japan and South Korea, besides possibly Australia and New Zealand in certain anticipated circumstances that have not yet materialised. The idea is to move towards an East Asian Community over the longer term.
Looking at the CECA as an aspect of Singapore's diplomacy in this larger perspective, Lee has spoken glowingly about the perceived rise of not only China but also India as the definitive leitmotif of an emerging new Asia, where, in his view, the U.S. will remain the "hyper power" for the foreseeable future. Obviously, and unlike in some other quarters of the world, he does not see such a "hyper power" status as a negative factor in East Asia.
Apart from the asymmetry between the U.S. on one side, and China as also India and Japan on the other, there is considerable asymmetry between Beijing and New Delhi, too, at the current levels of their economic progress and political activism on the global stage. Not surprisingly, in this context, but without touching upon this evolving dimension, Lee has said that the world "will have to feel our way forward" as China and India "rise".

pengadilan HAM

Sinar Harapan 20.09.2002
Antara Pengadilan Ham Ad Hoc atau Tribunal Internasional TNI Harus Memilih
Oleh Joss Wibisono
Eurico Gutterres, pemimpin milisi Ai-tarak dan Wakil Panglima Pasukan Pejuang Pro-Integrasi, menantang Uskup Titularis Lorium dan Administrator Apostolik Dili Monsignor Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, SDB untuk hadir sebagai saksi dalam persidangan dirinya di Pengadilan Ad Hoc HAM di Pengadilan Negeri, Jakarta Pusat. ”Kalau dia betul-betul tahu kejadiannya, kalau dia merasa menjadi korban, dia harus datang menjadi saksi supaya saya bisa dihukum,” kata Gutterres kepada sebuah media ibukota. Tantangan ini merupakan jawaban Wakil Panglima Gutterres kepada penolakan Mgr. Belo untukdatang ke Jakarta memberikan kesaksian di hadapan Pengadilan Ad Hoc HAM Timor Timur.
Apapun alasannya, (diberitakan Mgr Belo merasa keselamatannya terancam) dengan menolak datang maka berarti Uskup Belo sudah tidak percaya lagi pada Pengadilan Ad Hoc HAM Timor Timur. Bukan hanya itu. Dengan menolak datang, maka Pemenang Hadiah Nobel Perdamaian tahun 1996 ini sekaligus juga mendesakmasyarakat internasional supaya membentuk tribunal internasional Timor Timur. Tuntutan tribunal internasional ini makin lantang terdengar dari Timor Lorosa’e begitu Pengadilan Ad Hoc Timtim memvonis bebas para tokohmiliter dan hanya menghukum tiga tahun penjara tokoh sipil yaitu gubernur terakhir provinsi ke-27 Abilio Osorio Soares.
Inilah yang tidak dipahami bukan hanya oleh pemimpin Aitarak dan Wakil Panglima Pasukan Pejuang Pro-Integrasi Eurico Gutterres, tetapi juga oleh banyak kalangan di Jakarta. Masalahnya Wakil Panglima Gutterres dan paraelit politike Jakarta berkomunikasi di dalam negeri, sedangkan Uskup Belo dalam kapasitasnya sebagai seorang Nobel peace laureate mampu berkomunikasilangsung dengan dunia, dan itulah yang terus-terusan dikerjakannya.
Tribunal InternasionalDalam sebuah tulisan yang dimuat oleh harian International Herald Tribune, edisi Jumat 30 Agustus 2002, tepat tiga tahun referendum Timor Timur, Uskup Diosis Dili ini menguraikan bahwa keadilan tidak kunjung datang padabangsanya yang sudah merdeka itu. ”Pemerkosa, penyulut kebakaran dan pembunuh masih bebas berkeliaran, sementara orang-orang yang tidak berdosa hidup dicekam trauma. Trauma ini dan perasaan tak berdaya sebagai korban kembali bangkit ketika beberapa waktu berselang pengadilan di Jakarta membebaskan polisi dan militer Indonesia yang dituduh membiarkan perusakanitu berlangsung,” demikian tulis Mgr Belo.
Ia melanjutkan, ”Salah satu yang terkeji adalah pembunuhan massal terhadap sebuah konggregasi dan tiga orang pastor di Gereja Katolik Suai September 1999. Sebuah tribunal internasional diperlukan untuk bisa memberikan keadilan kepada para korban kejahatanterhadap kemanusiaan seperti itu.”
Lalu bagaimana dengan Eurico Gutterres? Siapa yang akan mendengar Wakil Panglima Pasukan Pejuang Pro-Integrasi ini? Siapa pula yang akan mendengar seruan elite politik Jakarta bahwa Pengadilan Ad Hoc HAM Timtim sudahberoperasi independen? Mungkin ada baiknya kalau Wakil Panglima Pasukan Pejuang Pro-Integarasi ini dianjurkan untuk, seperti Uskup Belo, juga mempublikasikan pendapatnya pada koran internasional.
Dari dulu, terutama akibat masalah Timor Timur, Jakarta selalu menjadi pariah dalam pentas diplomasi internasional. Ali Alatas misalnya pernah punya peluang (walau pun tidak terlalu besar) untuk menjadi Sekjen PBB,tetapi sebuah kolom José Ramos Horta pada mingguan Far Eastern Economic Review membuyarkan impian indah itu. Indonesia terlalu ternoda oleh TimorTimur, sehingga seorang diplomatnya tidak layak mendapat kehormatan memangku jabatan Sekjen PBB! Ali Alatas sendiri menjadi terkenal dengan ucapan bahwa Timor Timur merupakan kerikil dalam sepatu diplomasi Indonesia.
Sekarang, walaupun sudah ganti pemerintahan dan Timor Timur sudah merdeka, tetapi ternyata belum juga ada peningkatan yang berarti pada diplomasi internasional Indonesia. Bahkan, lagi-lagi gara-gara Timor Leste, Indonesia kini terancam kembali menjadi pariah.Dalam kunjungannya ke Dili belum lama berselang, Komisaris Tinggi HAM PBB Mary Robinson (yang sekarang sudah diganti oleh Sergio Vieira de Mello,bukan orang asing bagi Timor Lorosa’e) berjanji akan meneruskan tuntutan pendirian tribunal internasional kepada Dewan Keamanan PBB. Kalau DK PBB sampai membahasnya maka kembali diplomasi Indonesia akan kena bogem mentah.
Indonesia bisa jadi masih harus menelan pil pahit kalau kelak sampai terbentuk tribunal internasional yang mengadili mereka yang dianggap bertanggung jawab terhadap peluluhlantakan Timor Timur pasca-referendum 30 Agustus 1999. Ketika menghadiri KTT Pembangunan Berlanjut di Johannesburg, Senin 2 September 2002 Presiden Megawati Soekarnoputri mengadakan pembicaraan dengan Perdana Menteri Belanda Jan Peter Balkenende. Perdana Menteri baru itu langsung menyinggung soal pembunuhan wartawan Belanda Sander Thoenes di Becora tanggal 21 September 1999. Kapan pengadilan akan digelar, itulah yang ditanyakan oleh Balkenende. Sampai sekarang memang tidak seorang pun didakwa karena pembunuhan ini. Tak pelak lagi, masalah peluluhlantakan Timor Timur pasca-jajak pendapat akan terus menghantui Indonesia di pentas interansional.
Unsur Paling Peka Dalam tulisannya di koran International Herald Tribune tadi, Mgr Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo secara halus juga memperingatkan adalah tanggung jawabAmerika pula untuk tidak memulihkan hubungan kerja sama militer dengan TNI. Amerika sudah ikut berupaya sekuat tenaga mengamankan Timor Timur. Kalau sekarang Amerika berniat memulihkan kerja sama militer dengan tentara Indonesia, kalangan yang paling menanggung kepahitan dengan kemerdekaan Timor Leste, bukankah mereka akan bisa merasa terdorong untuk kembalimenimbulkan penderitaan bagi Timor Leste? Kalau sampai begitu apakah Amerika akan mendukung keadilan bagi Timor Timur? Demikian tanya Mgr. Belo.
Di sini Uskup Belo menukik pada unsur yang paling peka, itulah peran TNI. TNI memang selalu berada di atas hukum, menikmati apa yang disebut impunity (bahasa Inggris) atau straffeloosheid (bahasa Belanda), tidak pernah dihukum atas pelanggaran hukum (baca: pelanggaran HAM) yang pernah dilakukannya.Maka tampaklah betapa dalam soal sanksi Amerika dan pengadilan terhadap para tokohnya, TNI menginginkan kedua-duanya. Di satu pihak TNI ingin supayaAmerika menghapuskan sanksinya yang dikenakan, begitu Timor Timur luluh lantak menyusul referendum Agustus 1999. Di lain pihak TNI juga ingin supayapara prajurit dan perwiranya yang sekarang didakwa divonis bebas semua,sementara Jenderal Wiranto, Pangab ketika Timor Timur dicabik-cabik, juga tidak pernah dituntut. Bisakah TNI memperoleh kedua-duanya? Tanpa bicara adil atau tidak, keinginan seperti ini kiranya sulit terpenuhi. Melihat posisi diplomasi Indonesia, halitu nyaris tidak mungkin. Tak pelak lagi, TNI harus memilih, dan itu berarti harus berani bertanggung jawab, bukan hanya atas perbuatannya sekarang, tetapi terutama juga atas perbuatannya di masa lampau. Bukan hanya di TimorTimur, tetapi juga pelbagai tempat di Indonesia, khususnya sejak Soeharto tampil berkuasa.
Titik Lemah Timor Timur dari dulu memang selalu merupakan titik lemah TNI/ABRI. Bukan hanya prajuritnya, tetapi banyak pula perwira tinggi yang terjungkal karena Timor Timur. Misalnya Pangdam Udayana Sintong Panjaitan dan Pangkolakops Timor Timur Rudolf Warouw, keduanya harus meninggalkan jabatan-jabatan itu akibat pembantaian di makam Santa Cruz, November 1991. Dari pelbagai analisa yang ada, yang paling masuk akal adalah bahwa seperti peristiwa G-30-S, pembantaian Santa Cruz juga akibat konflik dalam tubuh TNI/AD dengan rakyattak berdosa sebagai korbannya.
Soeharto ingin adik iparnya, Wismoyo Arismunandar, tampil sebagai KSAD, padahal tokoh yang paling pantas dari generasi Wismoyo untuk jabatan ini adalah Sintong Panjaitan, orang nomor satu lulusan AMN tahun 1963. Maka Sintong yang juga anak emas Benny Moerdani harus disingkirkan. Di sinilah inti banjir darah Santa Cruz, dengan menyingkirkan Sintong, membuatnya ” bertanggung jawab” pada pembunuhan Santa Cruz, maka bukan hanya Soeharto bisa mengangkat adik iparnya, tetapi ia juga bisa terus mengurangi pengaruh Benny Moerdani. Dan memang akhirnya sebuah pengadilan di Amerika menggugatSintong, sehingga kalau dia berkunjung ke Amerika, akan sulit baginya untuk bisa lolos dari gugatan itu.Peristiwa besar lain yang berhubungan dengan Timor Timur adalah dicopotnya Hendropriyono dari jabatan Pangdam Jaya karena para mahasiswa Timor Timursecara spektakuler meloncat masuk ke Kedutaan Besar Amerika di Jakarta ketika berlangsung KTT APEC di Bogor November 1994. Dengan langkah gagah berani ini mereka berhasil membuat tuan rumah Soeharto menanggung malu besar di hadapan tamu-tamunya.Akibat keberanian mahasiswa Timtim itu, Hendro hanya sempat memangku jabatan Pangdam Jaya selama 18 bulan, padahal normalnya seorang pangdam menjabatselama dua tahun. Lebih pahit lagi, Hendro harus menyerahkan jabatannya kepada Kasdam Jaya Wiranto ketika para mahasiswa Timtim masih berada dalamgedung Kedubes Amerika. Jelas Soeharto sangat marah, sehingga baginya soal keamanan Jakarta hanya bisa dipercayakan pada bekas ajudannya. Dengan begitu jelas bahwa Wiranto naik pada jabatan Pangdam Jaya karena ulah orang-orang Timor Timur. Ini juga promosi yang luar biasa. Wiranto tidak pernah menjabat pangdam di manapun sebelumnya. Selain Wiranto, hanya duaorang perwira tinggi lain yang sempat menikmati promosi luar biasa seperti ini, itulah raja intel Benny Moerdani yang, tanpa pernah menjabat pangdam, langsung melejit pada posisi pangab. Yang lainnya adalah menantu Soeharto:Prabowo Subianto yang, juga tidak pernah menjabat pangdam, langsung bertengger pada jabatan Pangkostrad.Adolf Sahala Radjagukguk harus puas dengan jabatan duta besar di New Delhi, padahal sebelumnya ia dicalonkan untuk Washington dan setelah ditolak Amerika masih juga ditampik oleh Tokyo. Nasib serupa dialami oleh HermanMantiri yang juga gagal menjadi Dubes Australia.Adang Ruchiatna, pengganti Herman Mantiri dan Theo Syafei pada jabatan Pangdam Udayana, juga kandas kariernya. Seperti Hendro, Adang juga tidak sampai dua tahun menduduki posisi Pangdam Udayana. Waktu Adang menjabat pecah insiden Liquiça. Walaupun formalnya yang dianggap bersalah dalam kasus Liquiça adalah prajurit kelas teri yaitu Letnan Satu Jeremias Kase (inilahcara klasik perwira tinggi ABRI untuk menghindari tanggung jawab, yaitu mengkambinghitamkan anak buahnya), tetapi Adang Ruchiatna tidak melajukariernya.
Sebagai bekas ajudan orang kuat Orde Baru, Wiranto memang punya jalur khusus untuk tampil pada jabatan Pangdam Jaya. Kejatuhannya dari jabatan MenkoPolkam Februari 2000 juga paling spektakuler, sejauh ini. Lagi-lagi itu akibat Timor Timur yaitu pembumihangusan pasca-referendum Agustus 1999. Wiranto sendiri sampai sekarang masih selamat dari pengadilan, karenaperwira tertinggi TNI yang diadili oleh Pengadilan HAM Ad Hoc Timur Timur barulah Adam Damiri, yang di masa referendum menjabat Pangdam Udayana. Dalamkonteks inilah Wiranto mendekati Xanana Gusmão ketika, masih sebagai presiden terpilih Timor Lorosa’e, Xanana berkunjung ke Jakarta awal Mei lalu. Jelas Wiranto ingin melobi Xanana supaya sang presiden tidak mendesakdidirikannya sebuah tribunal internasional. Jangankan memenuhi standar internasional, dengan pelbagai vonisnya jelas Pengadilan Ad Hoc HAM Timor Timur tidak melenyapkan keraguan banyak kalangan. Maka tiada pula jaminan bahwa di masa depan tidak akan ada perwiraatau pensiunan perwira TNI yang diseret ke depan tribunal internasional untuk Timor Timur yang kini ramai dituntut masyarakat Timor Lorosa’e.
NKRI Jadi TaruhanSekali lagi, tentara memang harus memilih! Kalau ingin supaya Amerika memulihkan kembali hubungan kerja sama militer, dan supaya pamor diplomasi Indonesia di pentas internasional terselamatkan, maka TNI harus beranimengambil tanggung jawab terhadap peluluhlantakan Timor Timur. Menariknya vonis bebas pembunuhan di Suai yang ditunjuk Mgr Belo tadi keluar ketika Kepala Staf Komando Perairan Pasifik, Laksamana Thomas Boulton Fargo sedang berada di Jakarta untuk merundingkan pemulihan kembali kerja sama militer kedua negara. Amerika jelas dibuat malu, makanya State Department, Deplunya Amerika datang dengan kecaman terhadap vonis itu, antara lain jaksa penuntut disebutnya tidak sepenuhnya menggunakan bukti yang ada. Budaya tidak tersentuh hukum harus segera diakhiri. Kalau kita tidak bisamengakhirinya sendiri, masyarakat internasionallah yang akan melakukannya untuk kita. Kita sudah diberi kesempatan melalui Pengadilan Ad Hoc HAM TimorTimur. Tapi tampaknya kesempatan itu tidak kita manfaatkan sebaik-baiknya. Yang sekarang paling mengkhawatirkan adalah bahwa kemerdekaan Timor Timur makin membulatkan tekad Aceh dan Papua untuk mengikuti jejak Timor Timur menjadi merdeka, cabut dari NKRI. Dua wilayah ini juga menuntut tanggungjawab TNI terhadap pelbagai pelangaran hak-hak asasi manusia. Ini berarti bahwa posisi impunity, straffeloosheid atau enak-enak di luar hukum yang dinikmati TNI harus segera dibuang jauh-jauh. Kalau TNI terus ingin menikmatinya maka taruhannya adalah NKRI sendiri!
Penulis adalah wartawan dan pengamat politik yang menetap di Amsterdam, Negeri Belanda.

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ASEAN and collective security system

The Jakarta Post, December 7, 2004ASEAN and collective security system
The emergence of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as President raised high expectations in the region that he would initiate even stronger measures in the fight against terrorism. Such an expectation was reportedly expressed openly by Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, that Susilo would be a strong ally in the fight against regional militant groups.
It is not clear, however, what Arroyo was really up to when she said that ASEAN should attain collective security. Arroyo's assessment of regional security issues must have gone beyond the current regional security setting, as the region is already moving toward full integration -- but is, apparently, still far from being completely save from the threat of international terrorism. The threat of terrorism needs to be managed through collective endeavors in the region.
Whatever criticism can be made against Arroyo's idea of collective security -- its framework and assumptions on its practical prescription -- Arroyo's vision is positive, if not optimistic. Such a pronouncement suggests a more ambitious vision of what cooperative regional-international activities can achieve, especially through ASEAN.
The idea of regional collective security is, therefore, worth further analysis -- but, it should not be confined only to the management of the threat of terrorism.
The region will definitely be facing all kinds of regional security issues in the future. There is, therefore, a need for an updated regional security policy, so that ASEAN can enhance its capacity to respond collectively, and effectively, to some pressing regional security issues.
It may be worthwhile to subject the foundations of the notion of collective security to closer scrutiny. Collective security is understood as the maintenance of international peace. A concept that has long been linked to a collective attempt by the UN to maintain international peace. That concept envisages the universal renunciation by states of "resorting to force", save for a collective response to a threat to any member of a global security community.
This principle was supposed to govern the League of Nations, and the UN continues to uphold aspirations for its realization. Unfortunately, as a regulative principle, it is spectacularly lacking in historical success, as seen in the multilateral invasion of Iraq in 1991. It was more the product of the UN Security Council acting as a "concert of powers" than the emergence of a genuine, collective security system.
Threats to regional stability can occur at any time; they can also stem from any source, either internal or external. If ASEAN were to adopt collective security in anticipation of future regional security threats, then serious regional discussions would be vital, so as to make the concept of collective security as specific as possible.
Collective security is a coalition-building strategy, whereby a group of nations agree not to attack one another. Not only that, the concept also implies the defense of each nation against the attack of the others, if such an event should occur. But such a scenario is very unlikely to happen in the ASEAN context.
So, why would the concept of collective security be particularly relevant in the ASEAN context?
For ASEAN, collective security is a much more effective approach to security than individual member countries trying to act alone.
An ASEAN collective security system implies that ASEAN members countries possess the same rights and the same duties. Not only that, an ASEAN collective security system must be as flexible as possible, meaning that it should pursue the system in a way that supports the security of each member state, and in accordance with a code of conduct -- if any -- agreed upon by ASEAN member states.
ASEAN has, so far, been practicing "cooperative security". But collective security must not be equated with the concept of cooperative security. In the ASEAN context, a collective security system is a system for defining, safeguarding and -- if necessary -- enforcing the law. A cooperative security system, on the contrary, is restricted to defining, discussing and monitoring. Thus, it can be said that an ASEAN collective security system would begin where cooperative security left off.
What ASEAN had in mind, when it agreed to develop an ASEAN Security Community, was the prevention of undesired activities in the region. Here, active stability control wards off potential intruders through sanctions, to prevent an intrusion. Thus, an intrusion signifies the failure of the collective security system.
If active security control serves as a preventative mechanism, so does the collective security system, meaning that an ASEAN collective security system would also serve to prevent future security threats.
The road to stability, and perpetual peace and concrete progress in ASEAN, is still a very long way off, despite the acceptance of ASEAN Security Community. If ASEAN can eventually arrive at collective security -- as envisioned by Gloria Arroyo -- it would not only illustrate political progress in ASEAN, but also reflect a much more organized system of ASEAN regional security. Collective security requires multilateralism, and such a requirement was already met by ASEAN, when it decided to act collectively against terrorism and other threats.
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FP outlook 2005

The Jakarta Post, December 30, 2004Democracy and foreign policy: Outlook for 2005
It is no secret that foreign policy issues have always been external to the mainstream agenda of our national policy, particularly when Indonesia is bogged down by a series of domestic problems while in the midst of becoming a more stable and democratic country.
But many, here and abroad, will not forget the peaceful general elections this year, which can at least serve as a kind of modality for the country to be more prominent in its international standing. It is because of this peaceful event that Indonesia was lauded highly by the international community.
Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda even said that Indonesia's democratic process will be a significant contribution to foreign policy and diplomacy, in that it will stimulate the country to play a more active regional and international role, as reported in the Oct. 22 edition of Kompas.
Meanwhile, the change in the national leadership to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has raised hopes for a much more stable and respected Indonesia. The program introduced by Susilo, as well as his profile, has helped erase skepticism that the country will move at a snail's pace in its economic and political development.
His 100-day program is quite impressive, particularly because of the neglect -- at least in the public's view -- of the previous regime in providing such a program. Susilo is making a political transition toward a full democracy at an opportune time to rebuild public trust, domestically and internationally.
The eventful year is only the beginning of a very long process toward a full-fledged Indonesian democracy, one that will guarantee not only the country's diplomacy and its international position and credibility, but also the overall fulfillment of domestic needs.
Close observation of our political transition, particularly in relation to international relations as an academic discipline, shows that there is no issue that is as appropriate as the relationship between democracy and foreign policy. As such, the formerly prevailing notion that foreign policy is separate from domestic politics is no longer valid.
The government seems to be taking its best shot at how domestic development would be beneficial to the future of our international diplomacy. If one acknowledges that foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics, then domestic politics should not stonewall the potential achievements of foreign policy and international diplomacy.
If the country does not manage democracy in accordance with a long-term vision, then there is simply no way that it would be an important factor to foreign policy. The message sent by our successful democratic transition is one that underlines our strong adherence to the democratic principles governing international relations.
The current foreign policy initiatives of Indonesia seem to reflect the government's attempt to emphasize the democratic outlook, in a way that has never been done before. The participation of our president in international summits, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summits, his bilateral talks on such occasions and plans to hold an Asia-Africa summit are activities that explain the relevance of our election year to future international relations.
As the new leader of the world's third largest democracy -- which also has the largest Muslim population -- Susilo is bound to prove to the world that Islam and democracy can work in tandem in creating a stable Indonesia. It is important that the empowering moderate Islam as a national asset be a key focus of our foreign policy.
It is within this broad context of democratization that Indonesia is bidding for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
With its relative success in this first stage of democratization, Indonesia should be able to speak with greater authority and confidence when addressing issues like democracy, religious tolerance, terrorism and people trafficking. This is indeed in keeping with our Constitutional mandate that Indonesia play an active and independent role in promoting global peace and prosperity. The sheer size of the Indonesian population dictates that we should be more active in determining the course of global development.
Susilo's understanding of foreign policy and its domestic implications extends beyond the summit, as indicated in his recent request to our diplomats that they help the government improve Indonesia's bad image. He was reported as saying in the Dec. 14 online version of The Jakarta Post that we should restore our dignity, both domestically and overseas.
The president also seems to be aware of the connection between foreign policy and endemic corruption, with its current rank among the world's most corrupt countries.
Indonesia does not want to be seen as ignorant of the possible impact of corruption on regional stability and our regional policy, because corruption also facilitates transnational crimes; it has a corrosive effect on the country's credibility, as well.
Continued corruption and weakness will certainly result in domestic instability through high vulnerability to other crimes, such as drug and people trafficking. However, because its citizens are the ultimate victims of corruption, they will continue to pressure the government to fight corruption more effectively.
An unresponsive government will certainly incite more aggressive behavior from the public that will rattle the government as well as domestic security. In turn, regional stability will be affected significantly: Regional confidence in Indonesia will erode if it fails to perform a pivotal role in regional security. Susilo's request to our diplomats is thus understandable, because they are our standard-bearers on the international scene.
The government must recognize that if it does nothing about corruption, Indonesia will lose what little competitive advantage it has against other countries. Simply put, corruption weakens the country's capacity to enhance its international and regional diplomacy and compete in the international marketplace.
Rule of law and the Susilo administration's anticorruption drive should be made central to our foreign policy, so as to promote confidence in governmental institutions.
Here we see that the success of our democratic process should help alleviate the perception that we are corrupt country. This, however, can be done only if our foreign policy is geared to protecting our democracy and seeking foreign cooperation to lend additional weight to our fight against corruption, as well as to rebuild the economy.
Our foreign policy outlook in 2005 should not only focus on fighting corruption, terrorism or improving our image abroad, however; it must, of course, be more than the sum of these parts, because it must be one that will prevent this ship from sinking. It is thus imperative that foreign policy be given a special place in national discourse. Only through such a process can our diplomats gain better understanding and insight into our priorities in future foreign policy.
The success of our democratic transition and its contribution to foreign policy has set forth a new chapter in the history of Indonesia's international relations.
As John Lewis Gaddis wrote in his paper Diplomacy and Foreign Policy (2001), historians of future centuries will remember a significant policy about the one through which we have lived.

parlemen asean ?

The Jakarta Post, May 19, 2005The idea of ASEAN Parliament seems distant, but not unrealistic
The idea of an ASEAN parliament was debated at the recent seminar here on the Establishment of a Regional Parliament, organized by the Inter-parliamentary Cooperation Body of the House of Representatives. The idea of an ASEAN parliament is not new, but it did not emerge from an ASEAN process. It was first tabled by the Philippines delegation at the third ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization (AIPO) meeting in 1980.
The underlying argument was that such a regional body would be an effective decision-making mechanism and would help implement the regional policies of ASEAN. The idea surfaced again at the AIPO meeting in Phnom Penh last year.
Parliament is a political institution and its existence clearly reflects democracy.
It is therefore inevitable that the executive branch of government would have to communicate as well as consult with the parliament on major policy problems.
There is a parallel between the role of parliament at the national level and regional level. Globalization has given birth to pluralism in a way that it provides greater space for the involvement of other actors in the management of ASEAN regional problems. New regional issues, therefore, should not be the exclusive domain of the government of ASEAN.
The discussion on an ASEAN parliament should always be linked to the three main pillars of ASEAN cooperation -- security, economics and social and culture concerns. To strengthen such pillars, ASEAN needs to mobilize all of its regional components, including an ASEAN parliament. The ASEAN parliament would not only help translate ASEAN regional policies, but also offer a fresh perspective on the current development of the region.
Thus, the idea of a regional parliament is closely related to the level of regional integration here in Southeast Asia, although regional integration is a difficult and complex process. So far an ASEAN parliament is still an idea, perhaps even a nebulous idea. But if and when the region starts working for it, all aspects would have to be considered carefully.
The dynamics of regional integration is best illustrated by the European experience where credible initiatives for regional integration started only in the fifties. The European parliament, which was first constituted after direct election in 1979 is evolving. The process of European integration and the evolution of the European parliament offer useful insights for Southeast Asia to learn from in terms of following positive results and avoiding pitfalls, though social, political and economic conditions in Southeast Asia are vastly different from Europe.
No other region in the developing world has come so far forward firmly in emulating Europe in working for full integration. ASEAN, considered by many to be more successful compared to other regional organizations in the developing world, had never thought of an ASEAN parliament until 1980. The reason why the Philippines has been consistent with its idea of an ASEAN parliament is perhaps due to its belief that the region cannot avoid the global integrative forces brought about by the process of globalization.
During its initial stage, an ASEAN parliament can only start as a deliberative body. At this stage, one is not envisaging a regional executive on the lines of the European Council or Commission. It may still take many years before the next stage of Southeast Asian regional integration can be contemplated. The ASEAN parliament will therefore address its decisions or resolutions to the individual Southeast Asia governments or even ASEAN.
Because an ASEAN parliament will later be part of the regional architecture, those areas where ASEAN has been working and where there is already a regional consensus should be a subject of consideration. This in a way will give a variety of issues to the ASEAN parliament for deliberation. The development of an ASEAN community by 2020 should at least serve as an entry point for the regional parliament to consider salient regional problems faced by the governments of ASEAN. In such a framework, an ASEAN parliament can also deliberate upon security issues affecting the region such as terrorism, illegal migration and money laundering.
ASEAN parliament sessions and its committee meetings may be shared by countries in the region so that no country feels either burdened or neglected. Such meetings will expose local people and national media and sensitize them to fresh regional challenges.
This is how a harmonized regional perspective can gain momentum. The members of the ASEAN parliament, hopefully free from specific national constraints, may be able to think beyond their national position even on complex and sensitive issues. In the process, fresh constructive patterns may emerge for resolving such issues, and this in turn will strengthen ASEAN's three pillars.
Although an ASEAN parliament will not become the main regional decision maker politically, its voice in fresh regional issues should also be heard particularly when the vibration of regional integration is being felt even stronger now. The idea of an ASEAN parliament may seem quite distant, but it is not unrealistic. The distance between the idea and reality can perhaps be bridged by an understanding that a stable and peaceful united Southeast Asia can be accomplished if there is a high degree of participation by an ASEAN parliament in regional policy deliberations.

SBY and PLN

The Jakarta Post, May 23, 2005SBY's leadership for Indonesia and the world
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's government is only eights months old since its inception last October. The President himself realizes that as a national leader he needs to demonstrate to the public his ability to manage the country's national and international problems.
Although Susilo in his inauguration speech as the country's fifth president in October last year stated that he would concentrate on domestic problems, he cannot avoid seeing Indonesia as part of the international discourse, meaning that what he initiates domestically will certainly have some impact on the way the country conducts its international relations.
Thus it is important not to ignore the role of domestic factors in the execution of our foreign relations. Susilo pledged that he would continue to uphold the "free and active" principle of foreign policy, and is committed to make the voice of Indonesia increasingly heard internationally.
It is a fact that Indonesia is the world's fourth populous country and perceived to be the most influential in the region of Southeast Asia. It has more than 17,000 islands, spanning from the east of Malaysia to the western portion of the island of Papua New Guinea, and controls critical sea lanes thus making it a strategic regional state of Southeast Asia. The international community recognizes that Indonesia, under the leadership of Susilo, needs to initiate more national and regional policies to make the region safer and more stable.
The arrival of the Susilo government coincided with regional efforts to build a zone of peace and stability through the idea of the ASEAN Community. The government is witnessing that the region is only halfway toward building a strong, stable and integrated Asia Pacific community. It is thus important that the current government provides full diplomatic support towards the realization of such community.
Indonesia, however, should not see the world only from the perspective of its immediate region. Its vision of the world should go beyond its current status as the largest and most powerful Southeast Asian country, although Southeast Asia should continue to be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.
It is understandable therefore that Susilo has attended many important international meetings, such as APEC in Santiago, the ASEAN summit meeting in Laos, the ASEM meeting in Hanoi, in order to make the voice of Indonesia heard internationally and to announce its newness to the world.
In addition to his presence at these international forum, Susilo has made important foreign visits to, among others, to Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Timor Leste and China. To the surprise of many, Susilo was also seen at the funeral of Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, indicating the government's policy in supporting Palestinian independence.
The just finished Asian-African Summit here also reflects the importance of Indonesia as one of the vanguards of the Afro Asia movement. The country is also seeking a seat on the UN Security Council, a move that indicates its full support for UN reform.
This week there will also be meetings between our President and the leaders of two major powers, the United States and Japan. Jakarta is striving to reestablish good relations with Washington, while recognizing the fact that the U.S. is an important factor for the security and stability of the world. The Jakarta government, however, supports global sentiment that international issues be solved through multilateral frameworks.
If the Bush administration is able to reestablish ties with Jakarta, it will result, among other things, in more U.S. weaponry being sold to Indonesia, which can be used to patrol the country's critical sea lanes, and the reestablishment of IMET (International Military Education Training) programs. Indonesia's international diplomacy has even dragged China into its global policy framework by initiating a strategic partnership between the two countries, which is good anyway, as long as China does not consider Indonesia a junior partner.
So, here we see that foreign contacts, either through multilateral forums or bilateral mechanisms, are politically and strategically imperative if Indonesia is to be seen as proactive in promoting and securing the country's national and international interests.
Thus, on a more global level, the government will not only witness the continual rise of market democracies due to the globalization process, bringing with it hopes of prosperity, but also new opportunities. But the government must realize that this promising era is not risk-free. A host of modern threats, from terrorism to people trafficking and arms smuggling, have also gone global in that they ignore national borders and thus undermine the well-being of our people and the country's security. It is for this reason that Indonesia must commit itself to be continually part of the collaborative efforts at combating such threats.
Susilo must understand the nature of the changes that surround us. He must acknowledge that in a rapidly changing and interdependent world, the separation of national and international affairs is becoming blurred if not problematic. A more globalized world is bound to cause fragmentation on the one hand and integration on the other, either on a national or an international level.